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AN ILLUSTRATIVE HYPOTHETICAL: PAT’S PLIGHT 
Imagine the plight of Pat and Dana, a married couple residing in 
Washington State. Pat is a freelance software engineer, and Dana is a part-
time barista at Moondoes, a local coffee shop. Pat makes $60,000 annually 
from freelance software engineering, and Dana makes $20,000 annually 
as a barista. Dana generally knew Pat had secured a contract in mid-July 
2015 to work on a project for Macrodense, a multinational technology 
company. But, beyond general knowledge, Dana knew very little about 
Pat’s Macrodense project because they rarely spoke about much anymore. 
When the couple were wed in 2012, their relationship was rock-solid. 
However, after a year of marital bliss, the proverbial honeymoon was over. 
From 2013 to December 2015, Pat and Dana’s relationship was fraught 
with bickering, arguing, yelling, and crying. Finally, in January 2016, 
Dana could no longer stand the pressures of their strained relationship and 
moved out of the couple’s home. 
Pat, enraged and upset by Dana’s unwillingness to rectify the 
problems in their marriage, refused to speak to Dana anymore once Dana 
filed for divorce in late March of 2016. This lack of communication 
presented a serious problem for Dana in early April because Tax Day was 
quickly approaching. Having not received any response from Pat about 
their taxes, Dana chose to file a tax return with the filing status “married 
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filing separately”1 since Pat would not meet to sign a joint return and 
would not share 2015 financial information. Pat assumed, as most would, 
that “separate” meant separate—as in Pat’s finances are Pat’s and Dana’s 
finances are Dana’s; each are responsible for their own financial affairs. 
In fact, the front page of the tax form does not seem to indicate otherwise.2 
Pat’s return was timely filed on April 18, 2016.3 After the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) sent Pat’s refund, Pat thought nothing, and received nothing, 
about his 2015 taxes until January of 2018. 
In January of 2018, Dana received a “Notice of Deficiency” letter 
from the IRS alleging she owed the IRS tax on an additional $90,000 of 
income. How could this be? Dana had never missed a tax payment! After 
a little bit of investigating, Dana found the IRS alleged this additional 
money was owed because Pat failed to pay tax on $200,000 he earned in 
2015, primarily from the Macrodense project. But Dana thought that 
“separate” meant separate, so why would Pat’s income matter on Dana’s 
return? Since Dana did not resolve the matter during an audit, the IRS 
aggregated the couple’s income for the year ($20,000 plus $200,000, 
totaling $220,000), divided by two ($110,00), then issued Notices of 
Deficiency to each, respectively ($110,000 minus the $20,000 of income 
Dana already paid tax on). In Pat’s case, “separate” did mean separate with 
regard to the filing but not with regard to the underlying tax liability. 
In response, Pat filled out and submitted Form 8857 to the IRS 
requesting Innocent Spouse Relief. In preparing the Form 8857, Pat 
provided a significant, but non-exhaustive, amount of information to the 
IRS substantiating her claim. But, the IRS denied Pat’s request.  
Unfortunately, even if Pat timely petitions the Tax Court for redress 
in response to the Notice of Deficiency and has additional information 
substantiating the Innocent Spouse claim, the IRS still has a significant 
likelihood of prevailing given the undeveloped administrative record upon 
which the IRS relied in its denial. Notably, this significant likelihood is 
strengthened by the seemingly frivolous fact (in the context of federal 
taxation) that Pat was a Washington State resident in 2015. Based on this 
fact alone, it is unlikely the Tax Court will allow Dana to submit new 
evidence for it to review, even if the additional evidence is persuasive. 
                                                     
 1. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FORM 1040, U.S. INDIVIDUAL 
INCOME TAX RETURN (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040.pdf [https://perma.cc/96VL-
5QN9] (see “Filing Status” in Box Three for option to file separately).  
 2. Id. 
 3. The traditional April 15th filing deadline was extended to Monday, April 18th for tax year 
2015 individual income tax filings because of Washington D.C.’s celebration of Emancipation Day 
on Friday, April 15th and the weekend immediately following. See 2016 Tax Season Opens Jan. 19 
for Nation’s Taxpayers, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.irs.gov/uac/ 
newsroom/2016-tax-season-opens-jan-19-for-nations-taxpayers [https://perma.cc/8YRR-8DXU]. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Although this is a fictional characterization, most modern Americans 
know a real-life example of Pat and Dana—with or without the resulting 
tax problem. Between 2010 to 2014, divorces and annulments occurred at 
a steady rate of approximately one for every two marriages annually.4  
 
















2014 6.9 3.2 46.4 813,862 
2013 6.8 3.3 48.5 832,157 
2012 6.8 3.4 50 851,000 
2011 6.8 3.6 52.3 877,000 
2010 6.8 3.6 52.3 872,000 
 
From 2010 to 2014, the number of returns filed under a “married 
filing separately” status has shown a slight, yet consistent, increase—
approaching 3,000,000 in 2014.6 
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 4. See National Marriage and Divorce Rate Trends, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 
(Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/marriage_divorce_tables.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
KUG3-Z3TM]. 
 5. Although there exists an observable decline in divorces and annulments per one hundred 
marriages annually from 2010 to 2014, at no point dating back to 2000 has the number of divorces and 
annulments dipped below forty-five per one hundred marriages. Id. 
 6. SOI Tax Stats - Individual Statistical Tables by Size of Adjusted Gross Income, All Returns: 
Number of Returns, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-
individual-statistical-tables-by-size-of-adjusted-gross-income [https://perma.cc/J3RD-ZPW6] (last 
visited Apr. 4, 2018). These statistics are published annually by the IRS. See, e.g., I.R.S. News Release 
IR-2016-118 (Aug. 31, 2016); I.R.S. News Release IR-2015-104 (Aug. 26, 2015); I.R.S. News Release 
IR-2014-83 (Aug. 22, 2014); I.R.S. News Release IR-2013-67 (Aug. 13, 2013).  
 7. Hereinafter, “IRS.” 
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The IRS has identified only two possible benefits for an otherwise 
married individual to file under a married filing separately status: (1) if the 
individual wants to be responsible for only tax attributable to her own 
earned income or (2) if it results in a lower tax bill than filing a joint 
return.8 However, achieving a lower tax bill through filing a married filing 
separately tax return occurs in only the narrowest of cases; for example, 
an individual filer with substantial medical expenses.9 Medical expense 
deductions are only allowed to the extent such expenses exceed ten percent 
of adjusted gross income (AGI).10 By not combining AGI, an individual 
may qualify to deduct medical expenses where he otherwise may not have, 
particularly in marital circumstances where the non-deducting partner 
substantially outearns the other. But utilizing the married filing separately 
status comes with substantial restrictions and prohibitions and, ultimately, 
will result in a higher tax liability than filing jointly in most cases.11 
Outside of the narrow instances where it may be tax beneficial to file 
separately, a married individual is likely to file separately only to shield 
herself from exposure to her spouse’s tax liability. Robert Wood identified 
several instances where considering the separation of taxes may prove 
beneficial to shield an individual from marital liability: (1) where one or 
both individuals are exposed to high business or tax risk operations, (2) 
the potential “you never told me” problem,12 or (3) if a divorce is 
looming.13 Thus, it seems the most beneficial aspect of married filing 
separately is the ability to insulate oneself from his or her spouse’s tax 
liability. 
So, one may ask, what happened to Dana? She filed married filing 
separately but was still assessed tax for income received by Pat. Had Dana 
and Pat resided in a common law property state where a spouse is not 
individually liable for the debts of the other spouse, like Oregon,14 Dana 
likely would have been insulated from Pat’s tax liability. However, Dana 
and Pat were Washington State residents—a community property state.15 
                                                     
 8. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 17 CATALOG NO. 10311G, YOUR FEDERAL INCOME TAX: 
FOR INDIVIDUALS 22 (2017) [hereinafter PUBLICATION 17], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p17.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KVD2-M7CT]. 
 9. See I.R.C. § 213 (2012). All further references to “§” or “section” are to the 2012 bound 
version of Title 26 of the United States Code (the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.)), unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 10. Id. 
 11. PUBLICATION 17, supra note 8. 
 12. See, e.g., infra note 78. 
 13. Robert W. Wood, 95% of Married Couples File Taxes Jointly, Should You Join the Other 
5%?, FORBES (Mar. 21, 2016, 8:44 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2016/03/21/irs-
says-95-of-marrieds-file-taxes-jointly-should-you-join-the-5/#48595efa4bc6. 
 14. OR. REV. STAT. § 108.020 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.). 
 15. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (2016). 
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The initial liability protection function of married filing separately is only 
afforded to those taxpayers residing in common law jurisdictions.16 Thus, 
Dana’s appropriate amount of taxable income in 2015 equals one-half of 
Dana and Pat’s combined income for the year—not simply the income 
earned through Pat’s labor. 
Congress codified a relief provision to protect individuals from their 
spouse’s bad tax behavior in 198017 and greatly expanded the scope of 
relief in 199818 to address the lack of protection afforded to residents of 
community property states that file married filing separately returns.19 
Section 66 operates as a parallel to § 6015—a provision relieving 
individuals in certain circumstances from joint and several liability 
resulting from a jointly filed return20—for married filing separately filers 
who are residents of community property states.21 Sections 6015 and 66 
are similarly drafted and afford relief to taxpayers in similar 
circumstances. However, § 66 is severely limited in one respect compared 
to § 6015: redressability, particularly in the Tax Court. 
Part One of this Note details the historical background of joint and 
several liability in federal income taxation. Part Two introduces, 
compares, and contrasts the two statutory provisions Congress has enacted 
to relieve “innocent spouses” from joint and several liability. Part Three 
discusses the incongruent standards of review applied by the Tax Court to 
these—§§ 66 and 6015—two substantially similar relief provisions. 
Finally, Part Four suggests remedies to alleviate this incongruity. 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY 
IN INCOME TAXATION 
A. Joint and Several Liability: Married Filing Jointly 
In federal personal income taxation, married spouses are subject to 
joint and several liability22 for tax arising from earned income in two 
general ways: either by filing a return designated married filing jointly or 
by function of their resident state’s community property laws. 
                                                     
 16. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 118 (1930) (holding that income is equally divisible 
between spouses in community property states). 
 17. See generally infra Part II(A). 
 18. See generally id. 
 19. I.R.C. § 66. 
 20. Id. § 6015. 
 21. Id. § 66.  
 22. Joint and several liability is “liability that may be apportioned either among two or more 
parties or to only one or a few select members of the group, at the adversary’s discretion.” Joint and 
Several Liability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). For purposes of this Note, “parties” are 
each of the spouses individually in a marital union and “adversary” is the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue. 
1194 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 41:1189 
Married taxpayers have had the option to elect to file a single joint 
return—rather than file two separate returns—since 1918.23 The Revenue 
Act of 1918, the first of its kind to refer to a joint return, stated in relevant 
part, “If a husband and wife living together have an aggregate net income 
of $2,000 or over, each shall make such a return unless the income of each 
is included in a single joint return.”24 Use of the marital joint return was 
optional and it appears Congress introduced the option solely for taxpayer 
(and Treasury) administrative ease—not to impart joint and several 
liability upon spouses.25 
Despite this, the IRS insisted for years following that filing of a joint 
return should result in imposition of joint and several liability among 
spouses for their collective tax liability.26 In 1935, The Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue’s (CIR) persistent challenge was ultimately struck down 
by the Ninth Circuit in Cole v. CIR, where it concluded that simply opting 
to utilize the joint return does not result in joint and several liability 
between spouses.27 
However, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Cole did not stand for long. 
In 1938, Congress overruled Cole by enacting the Revenue Act of 1938, 
which read in relevant part: 
In the case of a husband and wife living together the income of each 
(even though one has no gross income) may be included in a single 
return made by them jointly, in which case the tax shall be computed 
on the aggregate income, and the liability with respect to the tax shall 
be joint and several.28 
Notably, Congress’s only rationale put forth to justify implementing 
joint and several liability under a joint return filing was for “administrative 
necessity”29—the suspect argument relied upon by the CIR and rejected 
by the Ninth Circuit in Cole.30 
Furthermore, holding individual spouses liable for tax resulting from 
their spouse’s apportionable income appears contrary to the progressive 
taxation theory under which our federal income tax system was originally 
                                                     
 23. Richard C.E. Beck, The Failure of Innocent Spouse Reform, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 929, 
933 (2007). 
 24. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 223, 40 Stat. 1057, 1074 (1919) (repealed 1921) (emphasis 
added). 
 25. Richard C.E. Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem: Joint and Several Liability for Income 
Taxes Should be Repealed, 43 VAND. L. REV. 317, 333 (1990). 
 26. Beck, supra note 23, at 933. 
 27. Cole v. CIR, 81 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1935) (“[S]pouses are not jointly and severally liable 
for a deficiency arising entirely out of the separate income of one of them. In the instant case, tax 
liability should have been apportioned between husband and wife in accordance with income.”). 
 28. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 51(b), 52 Stat. 447, 476 (emphasis added). 
 29. Beck, supra note 23, at 933–34. 
 30. Id. at 933. 
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established. In 1913, the United States followed a global progressive trend 
in matrimonial property law when it adopted an income tax system 
requiring mandatory filing of separate returns, regardless of marital status. 
This filing regime provided more freedom for women to manage their own 
property independent of their husbands.31 Thus, Congress’s adoption of an 
“opt in” joint return in 1918 was not offered to conform with the 
established progressive matrimonial property laws under which the tax 
system was established (quite the contrary, in fact), but to provide 
“administrative ease.”32 It appears the Treasury’s theory of joint and 
several liability was developed independent of any established 
matrimonial property law conformity or supporting authority from 
Congress or in common law.33 
The modern-day codification of joint and several liability in the joint 
filing context is found in § 6013: “[I]f a joint return is made, the tax shall 
be computed on the aggregate income and the liability with respect to the 
tax shall be joint and several.”34 As a result, joint and several liability 
grants the IRS the power to collect the full amount of any deficiency from 
either spouse35—a power that allows the IRS to go after the spouse who 
has assets more readily available for levy or lien, rather than the spouse 
who is actually responsible for the deficiency.36 
B. Insulation from Joint and Several Liability: Married Filing 
Separately 
As stated above, § 6013 subjects each spouse of a marital relationship 
to joint and several liability if they, as a couple, opt to file a joint return.37 
If, however, a couple does not opt in to filing a joint return,38 each spouse 
                                                     
 31. Beck, supra note 25, at 332–33. 
 32. Id. at 333. 
 33. Id. 
 34. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 35. Lily Kahng, Innocent Spouses: A Critique of the New Tax Laws Governing Joint and Several 
Liability, 49 VILL. L. REV. 261, 264 (2004). 
 36. Beck, supra note 25, at 363. 
 37. Supra Part I(A). 
 38. Both spouses are required to sign a joint return for the return to be valid. I.R.C. § 6061(a). 
The Tax Court has found a valid return by way of intent where a spouse otherwise did not sign the 
return. See Estate of Campbell v. Comm’r, 56 T.C. 1, 12 (1971) (holding “it has long been settled that 
where an income tax return is intended by both spouses as a joint return, the absence of the signature 
of one spouse does not prevent their intention from being realized.”). However, a recent Tax Court 
ruling tightened this explicit signature requirement. See Reifler v. Comm’r, 110 T.C.M. (CCH) 360, 
at *27 (2015) (holding that petitioners did not timely file a valid joint return because the return lacked 
one of the essential—and easiest to satisfy—requirements for a valid joint tax return, the signature of 
both spouses, dismissing petitioner’s reliance on the substantial consent compliance and tacit 
compliance doctrines). 
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must file a return with the filing status of married filing separately.39 
Unlike with joint return filers, Congress has never imposed statutorily 
mandated joint and several liability upon spouses filing separate returns. 
Thus, the spirit of Cole still rings true in separate returns (i.e., tax liability 
is apportioned between spouses in accordance with the individual’s 
respective earned income for the year).40 
By choosing not to opt in to joint filing status, an individual can 
successfully insulate herself from spousal tax liability; however, this 
insulation can come at a high price. Although the tax rates for individual 
spouses filing separately have consistently remained at half the rate for 
joint return filers since 1949,41 separately filing spouses are prohibited 
from taking advantage of valuable tax deductions and credits. Individual 
spouses filing separately are prohibited from taking advantage of the 
earned income tax credit,42 the Hope (American Opportunity) and Lifetime 
Learning credit,43 the student loan interest deduction,44 the child or 
dependent care expense credit,45 the qualified adoption expense credit,46 
and exclusion of qualified U.S. savings bond interest income used for 
higher education.47 Additionally, an individual spouse is prohibited from 
taking the elderly and disabled tax credit48 and is required to include 
eighty-five percent of social security or tier one railroad retirement 
benefits into income49 if the spouses live together at any time during the 
                                                     
 39. I.R.C. § 1(d). 
 40. Cole v. Comm’r, 81 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1935). 
 41. U.S. Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History, Nominal Dollars, Income Years 1913-
2013, TAX FOUND., https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/fed_individual_rate_history_nominal. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/GT3H-VJYH]. The Revenue Act of 1948 introduced a separate rate structure for 
joint filers for the first time. By granting “income splitting” to all married couples, this provided a tax 
advantage to couples living in common law property states that was previously only available to 
couples living in community property states. This separate rate structure provided a substantial 
geographical tax equalization between couples residing in the two types of states. Spencer Williams, 
Comment, Joint Income Tax Returns under the Revenue Act of 1948, 36 CAL. L. REV. 289, 291–92 
(1948). Professor Lily Kahng argues that Congress’s motivation for implementing the “income 
splitting” regime in 1948 was to render the stronger property rights of women in community property 
states meaningless for tax purposes and to quell the national movement towards adoption of 
community property laws—laws that, at the time, provided women stronger property rights compared 
to common law property laws—under the guise of the fictional ‘marital unity’ rationale. Kahng, supra 
note 35, at 272. For a further discussion on the fiction of marital unity, see generally Lily Kahng, 
Fiction in Tax, in TAXING AMERICA 25 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996). 
 42. I.R.C. § 32(d). 
 43. Id. § 25A(g)(6). 
 44. Id. § 221(e)(2). 
 45. Id. § 21(e)(2). However, a taxpayer may qualify for the credit if legally separated or living 
apart from their spouse. Id. § 21(e)(4). 
 46. Id. § 23(f)(1). 
 47. Id. § 135(d)(3). 
 48. Id. § 22(e)(1). 
 49. Id. § 86(c)(1)(C). 
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separate filing year. Finally, spouses are required to use the same 
deduction basis—standard or itemized—on their separate returns, which 
could be detrimental if a spouse with substantial available itemized 
deductions is forced to claim the standard deduction or if a spouse with 
little itemized deductions available is forced to claim itemized 
deductions.50 Thus, although the joint return is technically an “opt in” 
mechanism, the steep penalties incurred by not opting in many cases may 
constructively present no option at all.  
The litany of prohibitions imposed upon married filing separately 
filers coupled with the progressively incongruent tax rates of individual 
filers at higher income levels51 may result in a heavy penalty on one 
seeking liability protection from their spouse’s tax burden. Although 
spouses may choose to subject themselves to the heavy burden associated 
with separate filing, the filing spouses may not even receive the sought-
after liability protection if they live in one of nine states. 
C. Joint and Several Liability: Community Property State Residents 
Currently, nine states—Arizona,52 California,53 Idaho,54 Louisiana,55 
Nevada,56 New Mexico,57 Texas,58 Washington,59 and Wisconsin60—have 
community property statutes in their respective codes. Accordingly, the 
IRS recognizes these states as “community property states” for federal tax 
purposes.61 
If spouses residing in a community property state file jointly, they 
are statutorily subjected to joint and several liability in the same way as 
spouses residing in common law states.62 Unlike joint filing spouses in 
common law states, joint filing spouses in community property states have 
no mechanism by which to secure an initial presumption of separate 
                                                     
 50. Id. § 63(c)(6)(A). 
 51. Although a separately filing spouse and individual (single) filer maintain identical tax rates 
for up to $75,950 of reportable income in 2016, the marginal rates diverge in favor of the individual 
filer on any income in excess of this threshold amount. Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615. 
 52. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (Westlaw through 2018 1st Special Sess.). 
 53. CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 13 of 2018 Reg. Sess.). 
 54. IDAHO CODE § 32-903 (West, Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess.). 
 55. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2336 (West, Westlaw through 2018 1st Extraordinary Sess.). 
 56. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.220 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
 57. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-8(B) (West, Westlaw through 2018 1st Reg. Sess.). 
 58. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.001 (Vernon, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
 59. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (2016). 
 60. WIS. STAT. § 766.31 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 367). 
 61. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 555 CATALOG NO. 15103C, COMMUNITY PROPERTY 2 
(Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p555.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7HG-HAVG]. 
 62. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3). 
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liability when filing a return.63 But an individual common law state 
resident may secure an initial presumption of separate liability from her 
spouse by filing a separate return, as discussed above.64 Unfortunately, this 
initial presumption of separate liability mechanism—nor any other 
mechanism—is made available to spouses residing in community property 
states by way of filing status. 
This incongruity is not borne out of a statutory rule, but judicially 
determined in 1930. In Poe v. Seaborn, 
Seaborn and his wife, citizens and residents of the State of 
Washington, made for the year 1927 separate income tax returns as 
permitted by the Revenue Act of 1926 . . . . 
During and prior to 1927 they accumulated property comprising real 
estate, stocks, bonds and other personal property. While the real 
estate stood in his name alone, it is undisputed that all of the property 
real and personal constituted community property and that neither 
owned any separate property or had any separate income. 
The income comprised Seaborn’s salary, interest on bank deposits 
and on bonds, dividends, and profits on sales of real and personal 
property. He and his wife each [reported on separate returns] one-half 
the total community income as gross income and each deducted one-
half of the community expenses to arrive at the net income returned. 
The [CIR] determined that all of the income should have been 
reported in the husband’s return, and made an additional assessment 
against him.65 
The Supreme Court found (and the CIR conceded) that “the answer 
to the question [of whether spouses residing in community property states 
were able to equally divide spousal income between themselves for tax 
purposes] . . . must be found in the provisions of the law of the 
State . . . .”66 After an analysis of Washington state statutes and decisions 
interpreting them, the Court found: 
Without further extending this opinion it must suffice to say that it is 
clear the wife has, in Washington, a vested property right in the 
community property, equal with that of her husband; and in the 
income of the community, including salaries or wages of either 
husband or wife, or both.67 
                                                     
 63. Id. Section 6013(d)(3) does not distinguish between community property and common law 
property state residents; the statute explicitly refers to joint filers generally. 
 64. Supra Part I.B. 
 65. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 108–09 (1930) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 66. Id. at 110. 
 67. Id. at 111 (emphasis added). 
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Thus, the Court ultimately held that treatment of spousal income for 
tax purposes is based upon an individual spouse’s ownership interest in 
that income, not which spouse actually earned that income.68 For married 
residents of common law property states, Poe has no effect on spouses 
filing separate returns because their respective property interest69 and 
assumed liability70 is aligned with their respectively earned income 
alone—not their spouse’s. Spouses residing in community property states, 
however, have a proprietary interest—and by virtue, a taxable 
obligation—in half of the aggregate income of the spousal community.71 
Essentially, Congress has provided an insulating mechanism to common 
law property state spousal residents seeking preemptive severance from 
potential liability resulting from their spouse’s income for federal tax 
purposes.72 By contrast, however, Congress has failed to provide any 
mechanism to spouses in community property states seeking identical 
insulation, short of never marrying,73 entering into some form of 
contractual property settlement agreement, or subjecting oneself to audit 
or litigation.74 
II. THE INNOCENT SPOUSE PROVISIONS 
A. Introduction 
In 1971, Congress enacted the first iteration of “innocent spouse” 
relief.75 The Act provided relief to innocent spouses from tax liability 
arising from the omission of an item of gross income if: (1) a joint return 
was made; (2) the item of income in question was properly attributable to 
one spouse and exceeded twenty-five percent of the income stated on the 
return; (3) the innocent spouse did not know of, and had no reason to know 
of, such omission; and (4) taking into account whether the innocent spouse 
significantly benefited directly or indirectly from the omitted item and all 
other facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the innocent spouse 
liable for the resulting tax.76 Congress pinned this new legislation to the 
end of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954’s version of § 6013.77 
                                                     
 68. See id. 
 69. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 108.060 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.). 
 70. See, e.g., id. § 108.050. 
 71. See supra notes 52–60. 
 72. See supra Part 1.B. 
 73. See I.R.C. § 1(c) . 
 74. The only way to elicit the protections provided in § 66 is to request innocent spouse relief 
during audit or as a defense during trial. 
 75. Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-679, § 1, 84 Stat. 2063, 2063. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
1200 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 41:1189 
Congress was moved by judicial decisions holding to the detriment 
of the newly dubbed “innocent spouses”78—primarily the decision in 
Scudder v. CIR.79 Congress specifically noted the decision in Scudder,80 
evoking the words of the Tax Court: 
Although we have much sympathy for petitioner’s unhappy situation 
and are appalled at the harshness of this result in the instant case, the 
inflexible statute leaves no room for amelioration. It would seem that 
only remedial legislation can soften the impact of the rule of strict 
individual liability for income taxes on the many married women who 
are unknowingly subjected to its provisions by filing joint returns.81 
The Tax Court went on to acknowledge the severe risk assumed in 
agreeing to be bound by joint and several liability for tax purposes: 
This case is an extreme one to be sure, but it illustrates the degree of 
risk assumed by filing joint returns. It seems extremely harsh that 
petitioner should be liable for a tax based on money embezzled from 
the partnership which she and her sisters owned. However, under the 
terms of the statute, petitioner stands in the shoes of her husband and 
therefore is individually responsible for any tax deficiency legally 
applicable to the husband. No other interpretation of the statute is 
rationally permissible if the phrase “liability with respect to the tax 
shall be joint and several” is to be given its usual and long-accepted 
meaning in the law.82 
Although the statutory requirements for receiving relief were 
extremely rigid,83 the Act represented the first acknowledgment and action 
by Congress to address the potentially harsh and risky reality that joint and 
several liability presents for tax purposes. The statute mentioned that 
community property laws shall be disregarded when determining to whom 
                                                     
 78. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105th CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND 
RELATING TO TAX TREATMENT OF “INNOCENT SPOUSES” n.15 (Comm. Print 1998).  
 79. A case involving a husband who embezzled funds for his own personal use from the liquor 
store he managed, which was owned by his wife and her five sisters. The wife and her five sisters were 
unaware of the husband’s embezzlement. The embezzled funds far exceeded the reported income of 
him and his wife. The Tax Court reluctantly held that the wife was liable for the tax arising from the 
unreported embezzled funds. Scudder v. Comm’r, 48 T.C. 36, 37, 41 (1967), rev’d and remanded, 405 
F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1969). 
 80. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 78, at n.15. 
 81. Scudder, 48 T.C. at 41. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Compare the threshold relief requirement that the omitted item of income must represent in 
excess of twenty-five percent of the reported income to the current accuracy-related penalty provided 
in § 6662. Section 6662 imposes a penalty equal to twenty percent of any underpayment resulting from 
a “substantial underpayment,” which can be defined as ten percent of the tax required to be shown on 
the return. Compared to § 6662, an item of income had to be two-and-a-half times greater than 
“substantial.” I.R.C. § 6662(d)(1)(a)(I) (2012). 
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the item of income in question was attributable.84 However, the statute 
failed to provide relief for separate filers in community property states.85 
The first example of relief for community property filers appeared in 
1980.86 In the Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, Congress 
introduced § 66, which provided an alternative apportionment of 
otherwise community income between spouses who filed separate 
returns.87 The provision assisted taxpayers of this type who were married 
at any point during the tax year in question; who did not live together at 
any point during that year; and where no transfer, directly or indirectly, 
occurred between the two spouses.88 Under the newly drafted § 66, this 
was the only “relief” provision provided;89 yet, it was another first. 
In 1998, Congress stepped in again to aid innocent spouses.90 The 
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 
promulgated § 6015: Relief from Joint and Several Liability on Joint 
Return.91 In addition to § 6015’s promulgation, Congress added an 
equitable relief provision to § 66. The 1998 version of § 6015, although 
slightly altered over the years, closely resembles the current form 
of § 6015.92 Similarly, Congress has not amended § 66 since 1998. 
B. Sections 66 and 6015: Statutory Language Compared 
The language of §§ 66 and 6015 are remarkably similar in two 
specific sections. First, both statutes provide what is known as 
“traditional” innocent spouse relief.  
 
Language of § 6015(b) Language of § 66(c) 
1. In general.—Under procedures 
prescribed by the Secretary, if— 
a. A joint return has been 
made for a taxable year; 
b. On such return there is an 
understatement of tax attributable 
to erroneous items of one 
individual filing the joint return; 
Spouses relieved of liability in 
certain other cases.—Under 
regulations prescribed by the 
Secretary, if— 
a. An individual does not file 
a joint return for any taxable year, 
b. Such individual does not 
include in gross income for such 
                                                     
 84. Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-679, § 1, 84 Stat. 2063, 2063. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-605, § 101, 94 Stat. 3521, 3521. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
206, § 3201, 112 Stat. 685, 734–41. 
 91. Id. 
 92. I.R.C. § 6015 (2012). 
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c. The other individual filing 
the joint return establishes that in 
signing the return he or she did 
not know, and had no reason to 
know, that there was such 
understatement; 
d. Taking into account all 
the facts and circumstances, it is 
inequitable to hold the other 
individual liable for the 
deficiency in tax for such taxable 
year attributable to such 
understatement; 
e. . . . Then the other 
individual shall be relieved of 
liability for tax . . . for such taxable 
year to the extent such liability is 
attributable to such understatement. 
 
taxable year an item of community 
income properly includible therein 
which, in accordance with the 
rules contained in section 879(a), 
would be treated as the income 
of the other spouse, 
c. The individual establishes 
that he or she did not know of, 
and had no reason to know of, 
such item of community income, 
and 
d. Taking into account all 
facts and circumstances, it is 
inequitable to include such item 
of community income in such 
individual’s gross income. 
Then, for purposes of this 
title, such item of community 
property shall be included in the 
gross income of the other spouse 
(and not in the income of the 
individual).  
 
Second, both statutes provide what is known as “equitable” relief.  
 
Language of § 6015(f) Language of § 66(c) 
(continued) 
Equitable relief.—Under 
procedures prescribed by the 
Secretary, if— 
1. Taking into account all 
the facts and circumstances, it is 
inequitable to hold the 
individual liable for any unpaid 
tax or any deficiency (or any 
portion of either); and 
2. Relief is not available to 
such individual under subsection 
(b) or (c), 
The Secretary may relieve 
such individual of such liability. 
 
Under procedures prescribed by 
the Secretary, if, taking into 
account all the facts and 
circumstances, it is inequitable 
to hold the individual liable for 
any unpaid tax or any 
deficiency (or any portion of 
either) attributable to any item 
for which relief is not available 
under the preceding sentence, the 
Secretary may relieve such 
individual of such liability. 
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However, the two statutes do not share a fairly significant provision. 
Congress provided the Tax Court with express jurisdiction to 
review § 6015 challenges.93 Section 66, by contrast, does not have a 
parallel jurisdictional provision. A provision of this type is perhaps 
necessary for Tax Court review because the Tax Court is an Article I94 
court of limited jurisdiction and may exercise power only to the extent 
authorized by Congress.95 However, the Tax Court worked around this 
presumption in this context. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW INCONGRUITIES IN EQUITABLE RELIEF 
CASES 
Although a jurisdictional provision does not exist in § 66, the Tax 
Court has held that it in fact does have jurisdictional authority to 
review § 66 equitable relief cases in its interpretation of the last sentence 
of § 66(c).96 In Beck, the Tax Court applied its previous holding in Butler 
v. CIR—a § 6015(f) case—to assert its jurisdictional authority 
under § 66(c).97 
In Butler, the Tax Court noted that the petitioner raised her claim for 
innocent spouse relief in a petition for redetermination of deficiency 
pursuant to § 6213(a)98—also known as a “deficiency case” where the Tax 
Court traditionally holds jurisdiction.99 In deficiency cases, the Tax Court 
may consider all facts and circumstances, including innocent spouse 
claims, which historically have been considered affirmative defenses.100 
Accordingly, a taxpayer is entitled to raise an affirmative defense to the 
CIR’s deficiency determination.101 
The Tax Court in Beck noted, having determined that it holds 
jurisdiction over § 66(c) equitable relief deficiency cases, that 
both §§ 66(c) and 6015(f)’s equitable relief provisions were enacted in 
“the same section of the same legislation,” exemplifying the statutes’ close 
nature and Congress’s like-mindedness in promulgation.102 However, 
although the Tax Court took the “same section of the same legislation” 
congruent approach in determining jurisdictional authority, it has not taken 
                                                     
 93. Id. § 6015(e)(1)(A). 
 94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
 95. Block v. Comm’r, 120 T.C. 62, 65 (2003). 
 96. Beck v. Comm’r,  2001 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2001-198, at 1546. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Butler v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 276, 287 (2000). 
 99. Beck, 2001 T.C.M. (RIA) at 1546. 
 100. Butler, 114 T.C. at 287–88. 
 101. Id. at 288. 
 102. Beck,  2001 T.C.M. (RIA) at 1546.  
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the same approach in determining the appropriate standard of review in 
these cases. 
In Porter I, a § 6015(f) case, the Tax Court denied the CIR’s motion 
in limine, which sought to preclude evidence proffered by the taxpayer 
that was not previously included in the administrative record compiled 
during audit.103 It appears the CIR, in the context of a preliminary matter, 
sought review in Porter under an abuse of discretion standard of review 
rather than under a de novo standard. In doing so, it analyzed statutory use 
of the word “determine” in § 6015(e), contrasting it with the language of 
“redetermination” in § 6214(a).104 The Tax Court concluded that Congress 
drafted the language of § 6015(e) in 1998 under “full awareness of [the 
Tax Court’s] long history of de novo review.”105 In broader strokes, the 
Tax Court partitioned itself from applicability of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), thus relieving itself of an abuse of discretion review 
in § 6015 deficiency cases.106 The Tax Court noted: 
Since its enactment in 1946 the APA has generally not governed 
proceedings in this Court . . . . The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit, the Court to which an appeal in this case would lie, 
has held that “The Tax Court is a court in which the facts are triable 
de novo” and “the Tax Court is not subject to the Administrative 
Procedure Act.” This long-established practice comports with the 
provisions of the APA and its history. 
As a statute of general application, the APA does not supersede 
specific statutory provisions for judicial review. “When Congress 
enacted the APA to provide a general authorization for review of 
agency action in the district courts, it did not intend that general grant 
of jurisdiction to duplicate the previously established special 
statutory procedures relating to specific agencies.” 
The Code has long provided a specific statutory framework for 
reviewing deficiency determinations of the Internal Revenue Service. 
Section 6015 is part and parcel of the same statutory framework. Our 
de novo review procedures emanate from that statutory 
framework.107 
Unsurprisingly, the CIR did not agree with the Tax Court’s 
conclusion that it may review § 6015(f) cases de novo. Accordingly, the 
CIR instructed the Chief Counsel’s Office to continue raising evidentiary 
objections if taxpayers attempted to proffer evidence not contained within 
                                                     
 103. Porter v. Comm’r, 130 T.C. 115, 116 (2008). 
 104. Id. at 119. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 118. 
 107. Id. at 117–18 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
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the administrative record and provided the Chief Counsel’s Office with 
alternative arguments to be made on brief.108 Additionally, Chief Counsel 
attorneys were instructed to submit all briefs with this issue to the National 
Office for review.109 
But, after Wilson v. CIR, where the Tax Court, again, struck down 
the CIR’s argument that an abuse of discretion standard of review should 
apply in § 6015(f) cases,110 the CIR acquiesced to the Tax Court’s 
decision, stating: 
Although the Service disagrees that section 6015(e)(1) provides both 
a de novo standard and a de novo scope of review, the Service will 
no longer argue that the Tax Court should review section 6015(f) 
cases for an abuse of discretion or that the court should limit its 
review to the administrative record.111 
However, in § 66(c) deficiency cases, the Tax Court consistently 
applies an abuse of discretion standard of review with very little 
explanation as to why it has come to that conclusion.112 In fact, in the 2009 
decision in Felt v. CIR, the Tax Court acknowledged that there exists a 
potential problem in this discrepancy in light of Porter, but sidestepped 
the issue stating that it will “figure out Porter’s effect on section 66(c) 
[with regard to deciding the appropriate standard of review] in some later 
case.”113 But, it has yet to do so.  
This presents a marked disadvantage to taxpayers seeking review 
from the Tax Court of the CIR’s denial of their equitable innocent spouse 
relief under § 66, compared to taxpayers seeking similar review under a 
substantively similar statute.114 It is conceivable that taxpayers with 
identical cases could receive different results in the Tax Court—
undeniably illustrated in the words of the Tax Court in Wilson115—simply 
because one taxpayer filed a joint return and one taxpayer filed a separate 
                                                     
 108. OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., NOTICE CC-2009-021, 2 (June 30, 
2009), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-ccdm/cc-2009-021.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3CP-Q27G]. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Wilson v. Comm’r, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010-134, at 806. The Tax Court conceded it 
would not have found the CIR abused his discretion in determining the petitioner failed the economic 
hardship factor of equitable relief had it not looked beyond the administrative record. However, “[o]n 
de novo review, the result is different.” Id. at 810–11. 
 111. I.R.S. Action on Decision, I.R.B. 2013-25 (June 17, 2012). 
 112. See, e.g., Bernal v. Comm’r, 120 T.C. 102, 107 (2003). 
113. Felt v. Comm’r, 2009 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2009-245, at n. 15.  
 114. See supra Part II.B. 
 115. See Wilson v. Comm’r, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010-134, at 808–10 (concluding that the 
weight of five factors turn in favor of the plaintiff upon review of the trial record where they would 
otherwise weigh against the plaintiff if judicial review was constrained merely to the administrative 
record).  
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return in a community property state while seeking out the same safeguard: 
preemptory insulation from joint and several liability. 
IV. PROPOSED REMEDIES 
A. Congress Should Amend § 66 to Include a “Petition for Review 
by the Tax Court” Provision Like the  
Provision Under § 6015 
Congress sought to provide protection to innocent spouses almost 
fifty years ago. Through several iterations of innocent spouse relief 
mechanisms, Congress has expanded and liberalized its reach towards 
granting innocent spouse relief. 
However, the incongruity discussed above could potentially render 
an otherwise innocent spouse liable based upon a standard of review 
technicality that seems to have no rational justification for existing. 
Regardless of which reporting mechanism an innocent spouse filed—i.e., 
separate or joint return—that led them to Tax Court litigation, an innocent 
spouse deserves the same opportunity for redress as any other innocent 
spouse. 
Accordingly, Congress should amend § 66 to include a provision 
with language similar to § 6015(e) so the Tax Court may determine a § 66 
case under the same de novo standard of review as it would a similarly 
situated § 6015 case. This will provide equitable congruity between those 
spouses residing in common law states and community property states in 
innocent spouse Tax Court proceedings. 
B. Alternatively, Congress Should Amend § 66(c) to Provide a 
Stand-Alone Equitable Relief Provision Expressly Granting De Novo 
Review to the Tax Court 
If Congress does not provide an entire Tax Court jurisdictional 
provision116 to § 66, it should consider amending § 66(c) to delineate 
“traditional innocent spouse” relief and “equitable” relief from each other 
in separate subsections and specifically provide the Tax Court with a de 
novo standard of review under § 66 equitable relief deficiency cases. 
In its current drafting, § 66(c) is unnecessarily cumbersome. It 
purports to provide two distinguishable forms of relief within a single 
subsection. The Tax Court has already segregated these two types of relief 
by granting review in deficiency cases for equitable relief. The statute’s 
cumbersome nature is best illustrated when the Tax Court in Beck had to 
                                                     
 116. Presumably to not afford de novo review to the “traditional innocent spouse” provision in 
the first half of § 66(c). But this will further perpetuate incongruity between §§ 66 and 6015. 
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refer to “the last sentence” of the statute to identify what verbiage it was 
identifying as § 66’s equitable relief provision.117 Generally, the two 
provisions are distinguishable and should be segregated for 
administrability purposes as it stands already. 
In segregating the two, Congress could rectify the incongruity 
identified in this Note at the same time. Accordingly, § 66(d)118 should be 
amended to read as follows: 
(d) Equitable relief—Under procedures prescribed by the Secretary, 
if, 
(1) taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is 
inequitable to hold the individual liable for any unpaid tax or any 
deficiency (or any portion of either), 
(2) attributable to any item for which relief is not available under 
section (c) of this section, 
The Secretary may relieve such individual of such liability. 
(3) If the Secretary denies relief under this section, the individual 
may, in addition to any other remedy provided by law, petition the 
Tax Court (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction) to determine, 
de novo, the appropriate relief available to the individual under this 
subsection if such petition is filed— 
(i) at any time after the earlier of— 
(I) the date the Secretary mails, by certified or registered mail to the 
taxpayer’s last known address, notice of the Secretary’s final 
determination of relief available to the individual, or 
(II) the date which is 6 months after the date such election is filed or 
request is made with the Secretary, and 
(ii) not later than the close of the 90th day after the date described in 
clause (i)(I).119 
C. The Tax Court Should Heed Its Own Words 
If Congress is unwilling to provide a statutory remedy to this 
unnecessary and fruitless incongruity, the Tax Court should consider its 
words in Porter I and determine it has the authority to review § 66(c) 
deficiency cases de novo. 
                                                     
 117. See Beck v. Comm’r, 2001 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2001-198, at 1546. 
 118. The current § 66(d) provision (Definitions) should be amended to § 66(e). 
 119. I have not included parallel language to §§ 6015(e)(1)(B) and 6015(e)(2)–(6) for brevity’s 
sake, not because they are not vital portions of a workable provision granting Tax Court jurisdiction. 
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The Tax Court in Porter I took great strides to state that, generally, 
the APA does not apply in deficiency cases.120 It even went to great lengths 
to invoke the words of other courts that found that the APA does not 
apply.121 In Porter I, the Tax Court did not confine its analysis of the 
nonapplicability of the APA to just § 6015, but also broadly 
to §§ 6213 and 6214—the provisions granting it jurisdiction in all tax 
deficiency cases—by stating, “the Code has long provided a specific 
statutory framework for reviewing deficiency determinations of the 
Internal Revenue Service . . . . Section 6015 is part and parcel of the same 
statutory framework. Our de novo review procedures emanate from that 
statutory framework.”122 
However, is § 66 not part and parcel of the same statutory framework 
as well? Did the Tax Court not find this to be true when it found 
jurisdiction authorization over § 66 deficiency equitable relief cases in 
Beck?123 If Congress is unwilling to amend § 66, the Tax Court should 
apply its holding in Porter I124 to § 66(c) deficiency cases, as it applied its 
holding in Butler to Beck.125 
CONCLUSION 
Sections 6015 and 66 provide valuable relief to taxpayers who 
desperately need it. Congress should not be in the business of stymying 
relief to innocent spouses. This Note has presented an incongruity in the 
application of standards of review in the Tax Court in equitable relief 
deficiency cases. Nothing distinguishes petitioners in the Tax Court 
under §§ 6015(f) and 66(c) other than the mechanism of filing they 
chose126 and the state in which they live. Our federal code should not 
dictate different results based upon arbitrary distinguishing facts such as 
these.127 Adjudication should be based on all relevant facts in a case, not 
merely the ones available in an administrative record. The Tax Court 
should be allowed to review § 66(c) deficiency cases either through 
                                                     
 120. Porter v. Comm’r, 130 T.C. 115, 117–18 (2008). 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id. 
 123. Beck v. Comm’r, 2001 T.C.M. (RIA) 2001-198, at 1546; Butler v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 276, 
287 (2000). 
 124. Porter, 130 T.C. at 117–18. 
 125. Beck, 2001 T.C.M. (RIA) at 1546; Butler, 114 T.C. at 287. 
 126. In the case of separate filers, taxpayers may not have had the option to choose had the 
taxpayer’s spouse refused to sign a joint return. See supra text accompanying note 38. 
 127. See Wilson v. Comm’r, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2010-134, at 808–10. Had the petitioner filed 
as married filing separately, rather than married filing jointly, the Tax Court may not have granted her 
innocent spouse relief on one-half of the $540,000 marital community tax debt merely by virtue of her 
California residency. See id. at 804–06. 
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Congressional mandate or through the Tax Court’s own proper application 
of § 6213, or else this incongruity of justice will continue. 
